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1 Introduction
The evidence for the existence of price dispersion within markets is overwhelming, even
when products are homogeneous (as reviewed by Baye et al. (2006)). While some of this
dispersion arises from persistent differences between firms, such as service levels, empirical
findings suggest that much of it arises from temporary price reductions or ‘sales’. Indeed,
such sales activity is estimated to account for 20-50% of retail price variation and 38% of
all packaged consumer good purchases in the US.1 Consequently, sales are an active and
important research area in many disciplines.2
One major stream of the theoretical literature documents how sales arise in equilibrium
due to variation in consumers’ search frictions, or due to the existence of moderate adver-
tising costs.3 However, due to the associated technical complexities, existing models only
consider markets with symmetric firms, or markets with weak forms of firm heterogeneity
under restrictive assumptions.
This is a significant limitation for several reasons. First, firm heterogeneity is prevalent
in practice across many dimensions including products, production costs, service levels,
customer bases, and advertising costs. As detailed later in the paper, such heterogeneity is
consistent with typical empirical findings that show that firms employ sales, but differ in
their average price levels. Second, the limited analysis of firm heterogeneity restricts our
understanding of sales competition regarding issues such as how firm characteristics affect
sales and market performance, or how agents may wish to influence the degree of market
asymmetry. Among other settings, these issues are key when addressing policy concerns
such as mergers or vertical relations in sales markets. Third, the focus on symmetric
models also limits empirical research. Without a general foundation, current empirical
papers are forced to use a restrictive approach that attempts to ‘clean’ the data from the
effects of firm heterogeneities before applying the insights of a symmetric sales model.
To help resolve these limitations, this paper presents a flexible and tractable framework
that can simultaneously permit multiple dimensions of firm heterogeneity. The framework
can i) reproduce and extend many equilibria from the existing literature, ii) offer a range of
new results on how firm heterogeneity affects sales behavior and market performance, iii)
provide original insights into the number and type of firms that engage in sales behavior,
and iv) offer a deeper foundation to assess and extend current empirical procedures.
1See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Hosken and Reiffen (2004); and Steenkamp et al. (2005).
2For related reviews, see Baye et al. (2006) and Raju (1995).
3For example, Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Stahl (1989), Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez
(2004); Robert and Stahl (1993), Baye and Morgan (2001).
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In more detail, the paper provides an extended and fully asymmetric version of the
‘clearinghouse’ sales framework (e.g. Baye and Morgan (2001), Baye et al. (2004a), Baye
et al. (2006)). In the original model, the market is symmetric and each firm sells a
homogeneous product. Firms choose their price and whether to inform consumers of this
price given some advertising cost. Consumers are potentially split into ‘loyals’ that only
buy from a designated firm, and ‘shoppers’ that exhibit no such loyalty. In equilibrium,
as consistent with sales behavior, each firm randomizes between selecting a high price
without advertising, and advertising a lower price drawn from a common support.
We modify this model in two important respects. First, we allow firms to compete in
utility rather than prices. By drawing on the seminal (non-sales) model of competition
in the utility space by Armstrong and Vickers (2001), firms compete directly in utility,
u, together with an associated profit function, pi(u), that captures the maximum profit a
firm can make per consumer for a given utility offer. With little increase in computation,
this approach provides a high level of generality across many demand, product, cost, and
pricing conditions.
Second, we make a subtle change to the consumers’ tie-break rule in a way that can
generate enough additional tractability to permit multiple forms of firm heterogeneity.
In contrast to the existing literature which uses a tie-break rule that favors advertising
firms (e.g. Baye and Morgan (2001), Baye et al. (2004a), Baye et al. (2006) and Arnold
et al. (2011)), we consider a tie-break rule where consumers mix between any tied firms
with equilibrium probabilities. This distinction makes no difference in symmetric settings.
However, it offers additional flexibility under firm heterogeneity by allowing each firm to
have the same incentive to advertise a common upper utility bound. This ensures that
the resulting equilibrium is tractable while allowing firms to still vary in their advertising
probabilities and utility distributions.4
In Sections 2 and 3, we present our framework. To ease exposition, we first consider
the case of duopoly. After deriving the equilibrium, we demonstrate how the framework
can reproduce many equilibria from the existing literature and extend them to allow for
more complex market conditions including multiple products, downward-sloping demand,
4Specifically, the previous literature assumes that if shoppers expect a non-advertising firm to set some
price p, while another firm advertises the same price, then all shoppers trade with the advertising firm.
This ‘pro-advertiser’ rule is justified in the listing interpretation of the clearinghouse model (Baye and
Morgan (2001)) where any shopper who visits the clearinghouse strictly prefers to buy from a listed firm
rather than an equivalent non-listed firm to avoid an additional visit cost. However, we focus more on the
advertising interpretation of the clearinghouse model (Baye et al. (2004a) and Baye et al. (2006)) where
shoppers receive all adverts before making any visit decisions. Here, the ‘pro-advertiser’ rule seems less
reasonable. Instead, as consistent with our tie-break rule, shoppers should be willing to visit any firm
with the same expected price.
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and positive advertising costs. Among many others, these include symmetric models such
as Varian (1980), Baye et al. (2004a), Baye et al. (2006), and Simester (1997), as well as
specific asymmetric models, such as Narasimhan (1988), Baye et al. (1992), and Kocas
and Kiyak (2006).
In Section 4, we perform a range of comparative statics to offer a number of new
insights into how firm heterogeneity affects sales behavior and market performance. In
particular, we consider the effects of a change in a single firm’s share of loyal consumers,
advertising costs, or profit function. In many cases, these comparative statics differ to
the well-known results for symmetric markets.
Section 5 further illustrates the ability of the framework to produce new insights by
considering markets with more than two firms. Here, existing research on sales with
heterogeneous firms is particularly scant due to the additional complexities involved.
However, in a setting with heterogeneous firms, unit demand, and zero advertising costs,
the existing literature suggests that only two firms can ever engage in sales behavior while
any remaining firms simply price highly to their loyal consumers (Baye et al. (1992), Kocas
and Kiyak (2006) and Shelegia (2012)). In contrast, we show that this two-firm result
is a special case of our more general findings. In particular, once we allow for positive
advertising costs, any number of firms k∗ ∈ [2, n] can engage in equilibrium sales and
advertising behavior. While this result appears surprising, its explanation is intuitive.
Higher advertising costs soften competition for the shoppers and prompt some relatively
inefficient or low quality firms to start using sales despite the increased costs of doing so.
This relationship offers an interesting empirical prediction that is yet to be tested. In
addition, we then provide a broad characterization of the types of firms that are likely
to advertise in equilibrium. For instance, ceteris paribus, sales will be used by more
profitable firms with relatively low loyal shares and low advertising costs.
Finally, Section 6 details how our framework can be used to assess and extend current
empirical procedures. Typical empirical methods attempt to ‘clean’ raw price data from
any firm-level heterogeneities by first estimating a price regression with firm fixed-effects,
before then using the price residuals as the basis for testing theoretical predictions and/or
offering structural estimates of market parameters in sales markets.5 However, this ap-
proach is known to be restrictive. In the only theoretical justification within the literature,
Wildenbeest (2011) shows that the procedure is valid in a setting of unit demand and zero
5Examples include Sorensen (2000), Lach (2002), Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Barron et al. (2004),
Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata (2011), Pennerstorfer et al. (2015), and Sherman and Weiss (2015);
Wildenbeest (2011), Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013), Giulietti et al. (2014), Allen et al. (2014), and An
et al. (2015).
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advertising costs if firms differ in quality and costs under a specific condition. We exploit
our general framework to further explore the procedure in two ways. First, we show that
a related specific condition can exist under downward-sloping demand, but that the re-
quired empirical procedure becomes much more complex and data-intensive. Second, we
suggest a basis for a modified procedure that can consider unit demand settings under a
much broader range of firm heterogeneity than that considered by Wildenbeest (2011).
These insights should help future empirical work to better understand sales behavior and
price dispersion.
Related Literature: Armstrong and Vickers (2001) introduced the concept of compe-
tition in the utility space and embedded this approach into a range of discrete-choice
pure-strategy equilibrium settings. In contrast, we transfer their utility approach into a
qualitatively different asymmetric (clearinghouse) model with advertising, where i) con-
sumers are initially uninformed about firm’s utility offers, and ii) consumers have identical
preferences, such that the equilibrium necessarily involves mixing in utility for most pa-
rameter values. Some past sales papers have also made reference to competition in utility
or ‘surplus’.6 However, unlike our framework, these papers only use utility as a means of
computing sales equilibria in very specific market settings, and do not use the associated
profit function, pi(u), to explore any general results, implications or wider questions.
As detailed later in the paper, the few existing models of sales with firm heterogeneity
often assume single products, unit demand, and zero advertising costs (e.g. Narasimhan
(1988), Baye et al. (1992), and Kocas and Kiyak (2006)). Our framework can often
reproduce and extend such equilibria. However, our framework cannot reproduce the
equilibria in two recent sales papers. First, under unit demand, Arnold et al. (2011)
present a clearinghouse duopoly model with positive advertising costs where firms differ
in their shares of loyal consumers. However, contrary to our framework, they maintain
the past literature’s ‘pro-advertiser’ tie-break rule. This generates a different form of sales
equilibrium which, unlike ours, does not converge to standard asymmetric equilibria within
the literature when advertising costs tend to zero (e.g. Narasimhan (1988)). Second,
Anderson et al. (2015) allow for firm heterogeneity in a non-clearinghouse model without
loyal consumers where firms must advertise to earn positive profits. Unlike our model,
they find that only two firms can ever engage in sales and advertising behavior when
firms are heterogeneous, regardless of the level of advertising costs. As such, they cannot
connect to the larger clearinghouse literature or analyze how market factors affect the
6See Simester (1997), Hosken and Reiffen (2007), Wildenbeest (2011), Dubovik and Janssen (2012),
Anderson et al. (2015).
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number and type of firms that use sales. Instead, they focus on some different issues
surrounding equilibrium selection and welfare.
2 Model
Let there be two firms, i = a, b, and a unit mass of risk-neutral consumers with a zero
outside option. Suppose that firm i competes by choosing a utility offer (net of any
associated payments), ui ∈ <. Consumers have identical preferences in the sense that all
consumers value firm i’s offering at exactly ui. The maximum possible profit that firm i
can extract per consumer when providing ui is then defined as pii(ui).
The source of utility and the associated profit function for each firm can be allowed
to depend upon a rich set of factors, including demand, product, and cost conditions.
However, to provide a simple illustrative example, let firm i sell a single good at price pi
with marginal cost ci, and suppose consumers have a unit demand with a willingness to
pay of Vi. If firm i sets a price pi, its utility offer then equals ui = Vi− pi, while its profits
per consumer are pii(ui) = Vi − ci − ui for ui ≥ 0, and pii(ui) = 0 otherwise.
For each firm, we assume that pii(ui) is independent of the number of consumers served.
We also assume that pii(ui) is continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave in ui
with a unique maximizer at firm i’s monopoly utility level, umi ≥ 0.7 This implies the
following. First, as a necessary condition for sales behavior, we require each firm’s per
consumer monopoly profits to be strictly positive, pii(u
m
i ) > 0; otherwise firms would only
ever be willing to select ui = u
m
i . Second, as pii(ui) is strictly decreasing in ui > u
m
i ,
we denote uˆi as the unique maximum utility offer that firm i can make while breaking
even, such that pii(ui) < 0 for all ui > uˆi. It then follows that pii(u
m
i ) > pii(uˆi) = 0 and
uˆi > u
m
i ≥ 0.
Consumers are initially uninformed about firms’ utility offers. Each firm can choose
whether or not to inform consumers of its offer through informative advertising under
the following assumptions. First, as consistent with all previous clearinghouse models,
any advert is observed by all consumers. Second, to maintain our focus, we follow the
‘advertising’ version of the clearinghouse model (Baye et al. (2004a), Baye et al. (2006))
by keeping advertising costs exogenous. However, in contrast to the past literature, we
allow the advertising costs to differ across firms, Ai. Third, each advertising cost is
7For ii) note that consumer’s optimal behavior is embedded in pii(ui). Thus, for example, in the unit
demand example above, pii(ui) = 0 for ui < 0, and so profits are maximized at u
m
i = 0.
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strictly positive, with Ai > 0 for i = a, b.
8 Now, by defining firm i’s advertising decision
as ai ∈ {0, 1}, and given the utility offer and advertising decision of firm j 6= i, we can
then describe the total proportion of consumers that buy from firm i as q(ui, uj; ai, aj),
together with firm i’s total profits, Πi = pii(ui)q(ui, uj; ai, aj)− aiAi.
Regardless of whether or not firm i has advertised, consumers must visit firm i to make
a purchase. Thus, advertising only acts to ensure that consumers know a firm’s utility
offer before visiting. While these assumptions can be relaxed, we simplify exposition by
assuming that consumers can only visit one firm and that the cost of making such a visit
is negligible. Therefore, consumers may either visit an advertising firm to buy from its
known utility offer, visit a non-advertising firm to discover its utility offer and potentially
buy, or immediately exit the market.9
Consumers are potentially decomposed into two types, t ∈ {L, S}, with proportions,
θ and (1− θ) respectively, where θ ≥ 0. Regardless of any advertised information, ‘loyal’
consumers, t = L, only ever visit their designated ‘local’ firm. We allow firms to differ in
the size of their loyal consumer base, θi ≥ 0, with θa + θb = θ. The remaining ‘shopper’
consumers, t = S, have no such loyalty. They compare any advertised offers with the
utility they expect at any non-advertising firm, and visit the firm with the highest expected
utility offer. Having visited a firm, any consumer then buys according to its underlying
demand function if the firm offers non-negative utility, and exits otherwise.
We analyze the following game. In Stage 1, each firm simultaneously chooses its utility
offer, ui ∈ <, and its advertising decision, ai ∈ {0, 1}. To allow for mixed strategies, define
i) αi ∈ [0, 1] as firm i’s advertising probability, ii) FAi (u) as firm i’s utility distribution
when advertising, on support [uA, u¯A], and iii) FNi (u) as firm i’s utility distribution when
not advertising, on support [uN , u¯N ]. In Stage 2, consumers observe any advertisements
and then make their visit and purchase decisions in accordance with the strategies outlined
above.
We consider equilibria where all players hold correct beliefs, and where, given all
other players’ strategies, firms select their utility and advertising strategy optimally, and
shoppers have no incentive to change their visit and purchase decisions. Specifically, we
8This ensures that our later tie-breaking probabilities are well-defined. However, as later verified, our
equilibrium is well-behaved in the sense that when Ai = Aj → 0, it converges to the equilibrium of a
parallel model that allows for Ai = Aj = 0 explicitly.
9These assumptions can be substantially generalized by allowing consumers to visit the firms sequen-
tially provided that i) the costs of any first visit are not too large, and ii) each consumer may only
purchase from a single firm. The latter ‘one-stop shopping’ assumption may be reasonable in markets
such as supermarkets and restaurants, and is frequently assumed in consumer search models, and the
wider literature on price discrimination. For technical details, see later Appendix C.
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focus on equilibria that involve the following tie-breaking rule: whenever shoppers are
indifferent between the offers from advertising firm(s) and/or the expected offers from
non-advertising firm(s), shoppers visit firm i with probability xi, where xi is determined
as part of equilibrium and where xa + xb = 1. As detailed in the introduction, while
natural, this rule differs from the previous literature’s ‘pro-advertiser’ rule, where in the
event of a tie between an advertising firm and a non-advertising firm, all shoppers are
required to visit the advertising firm (Baye and Morgan (2001), Baye et al. (2004a), Baye
et al. (2006), and Arnold et al. (2011)).
While our tie-breaking rule provides a lot of tractability, it is not sufficient to avoid
an implicit assumption that is pervasive in the existing literature. We are the first to
formally state it:
uma = u
m
b = u
m (Assumption U)
Assumption U requires that both firms offer the same monopoly utility. However, it
makes no restrictions on each firms’ monopoly profits, pii(u
m) ≡ pimi . Hence, it actually
permits a wide range of settings that go well beyond the previous literature including i)
all symmetric settings, ii) any asymmetric setting where consumers have unit demands or
where firms use two-part tariffs as then uma = u
m
b = 0, and iii) any setting with asymmetric
loyal shares and/or advertising costs provided the firms share a common profit function,
pia(u) = pib(u) = pi(u). Outside Assumption U, the tractability provided by our tie-
breaking rule is lost: shoppers strictly prefer one firm when neither advertises and any
resulting mixed strategy equilibria loses significant elegance, although some qualitative
features of our equilibrium remain.
Finally, we assume that both firms have some potential incentive to advertise. As-
sumption A makes a minimal restriction to ensure that firm i’s profits from not advertising
with ui = u
m and selling only to its loyal consumers, θipi
m
i , are less than the profits it could
obtain by advertising an offer of just above um to gain all the shoppers, (1− θj)pimi −Ai.
This assumption is relatively innocuous but allows us to focus on equilibria where both
firms advertise.
Ai ≤ (1− θ)pimi ∀i = a, b (Assumption A)
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
We proceed in a series of steps. First, any firm that does not advertise will optimally set
the monopoly utility level, um, with probability one, such that uNi = u¯
N
i = u
m for i = a, b.
This follows as i) each firm has monopoly power over its loyal consumers, and ii) if any
shoppers search a firm with expectations at or above um, then that firm would prefer to
offer um as consumers cannot purchase elsewhere.
Next, under our tie-breaking rule, any advertised offer of um is strictly dominated by
not advertising because advertising has no impact on consumer behavior in a tie and yet
costs, Ai > 0. Hence, firm i will only ever advertise with ui > u
m such that the lower
bound of its advertised utility support is strictly greater than its upper non-advertised
utility bound, uAi > u¯
N
i = u
m for i = a, b. Therefore, from this point forward, we
can simply refer to firm i’s utility distribution unconditional on advertising, Fi(u), with
associated support, [um, u¯i]. Firm i then advertises with the probability that it offers a
utility greater than um, αi = 1− Fi(um).
By selecting um and not advertising, firm i will only ever possibly trade with the
shoppers if i) firm j also chooses not to advertise, and ii) the shoppers visit i rather than
j in the subsequent tie. Consequently, when combined with the revenues from firm i’s
loyal consumers, firm i can always guarantee the following total profits by not advertising,
for any given xi and αj:
pimi [θi + xi(1− αj)(1− θ)] (1)
Given positive advertising costs, there can be no equilibrium where both firms advertise
with probability one because a firm would deviate to avoid the advertising cost. However,
as now formalized below, the unique symmetric equilibrium will take one of two forms
depending upon the level of advertising costs: when advertising costs are sufficiently large,
neither firm advertises, but for lower advertising costs, both firms advertise with interior
probabilities.
We first consider the latter form of equilibrium. Suppose, as later derived, that both
firms advertise with probabilities, αi ∈ (0, 1) for i = a, b, and that the tie-breaking
probabilities equal xa and xb. Then, by adapting standard arguments, one can show that
no equilibrium exists with pure utility strategies. Instead, it follows that:
Lemma 1. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, whenever a firm advertises, it randomizes its
utility offer from a common interval (um, u¯] without gaps or point masses.
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For each firm to advertise with an interior probability, αi ∈ (0, 1) for i = a, b, firm
i’s profits from not advertising in (1) must equal its profits from advertising an offer
slightly higher than um, where for a cost of Ai it can win the shoppers outright with the
probability that its rival does not advertise, 1 − αj. Hence, for both firms, we require
pimi [θi+xi(1−αj)(1−θ)] = pimi [θi+(1−αj)(1−θ)]−Ai. From this, for a given xj = 1−xi,
we can state:
αi = 1− Aj
xi(1− θ)pimj
. (2)
Now note that each firm must always expect to earn its equilibrium profits, p¯ii, when
mixing over advertising. By substituting αi from (2) into the profits from not advertising
(1), and using xj = 1 − xi, we obtain (3). Equilibrium profits therefore derive from two
channels: the existence of loyal consumers and costly advertising.
p¯ii = θipi
m
i +
xi
1− xiAi (3)
Next, we derive the utility distributions. By advertising any offer within (um, u¯],
firm i gains expected profits of pii(u)[θi + (1 − θ)Fj(u)] − Ai. Intuitively, firm i always
collects its loyal consumer profits but also wins the profits of the (1 − θ) shoppers with
the probability that firm j does not advertise a higher utility, Fj(u). For each firm to be
indifferent over the advertising support, their respective expected profits must be equal
for each u ∈ (um, u¯]. Moreover, for each firm to be indifferent between advertising and not
advertising, these expected profits must equal the firm’s respective equilibrium profits. As
there are no mass points within (um, u¯], this requires p¯ii = pii(u)[θi + (1 − θ)Fj(u)] − Ai
for i = a, b. By substituting from (3) and reversing subscripts, firm i’s utility distribution
can be expressed by (4), where Fi(u
m) = 1− αi as expected.
Fi(u) =
p¯ij − θjpij(u) + Aj
(1− θ)pij(u) =
xiθj[pi
m
j − pij(u)] + Aj
xi(1− θ)pij(u) (4)
We now find the upper bound, u¯, and the equilibrium tie-breaking probabilities, xi
and xj. As there is no point mass at u¯, a firm that advertises u¯ will definitely win all the
shoppers, such that p¯ii = (1− θj)pii(u¯)− Ai. By substituting from (3), we can express xi
with the first equality in (5) below. The second equality then follows by using 1−xi = xj
and reversing all the subscripts.
xi = 1− Ai
pii(u¯)(1− θj)− θipimi
=
Aj
pij(u¯)(1− θi)− θjpimj
(5)
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Intuitively, the equilibrium tie-breaking probabilities ensure each firm has the same in-
centive to advertise the common upper utility bound u¯. This creates significant flexibility
and rules out any mass points in the distribution of advertised utilities. In a symmetric
market, it follows that xa = xb = 0.5. More generally, xi is determined in a way that
offsets any asymmetries and aligns the incentives of the two firms to offer higher utilities
at u¯. In particular, as later verified in Section 4, xi is i) decreasing in factors that dis-
courage firm i from advertising higher utilities, such as firm i’s loyal share, θi, advertising
costs, Ai, and monopoly profits, pi
m
i , but ii) increasing in factors that encourage firm i
to advertise higher utilities, such as firm i per-consumer profits at u¯, pii(u¯). Now, as
xa + xb = 1, one can sum (5) over i = a, b and set equal to one:
Aa
pia(u¯)(1− θb)− θapima
+
Ab
pib(u¯)(1− θa)− θbpimb
= 1 (6)
This offers an implicit expression for the equilibrium upper utility bound, u¯. The
existence of a unique solution can be guaranteed if the advertising costs are sufficiently
low. This follows as the LHS of (6) is strictly increasing in u¯, Aa and Ab. Therefore, to
ensure u¯ > um, an upper bound on advertising costs can be found by substituting um for
u¯ in (6) and rearranging to give (7). This restriction is tighter than that provided under
Assumption A.
Aa
pima
+
Ab
pimb
≤ 1− θ (7)
The solution for u¯ further ensures a unique set of resulting interior tie-breaking prob-
abilities xa and xb in (5) because it implies pii(u¯)(1 − θj) + θipimi > 0, and so each of the
two elements on the LHS of (6) are bounded between zero and one.10
When advertising costs are too high to satisfy (7), the game has a different, simpler
form of equilibrium. Here, for a relevant range of xa and xb, the high costs of advertising
ensure that both firms simply select um and refrain from advertising. Proposition 1
10In an extreme case where the firms are asymmetric but Aa = Ab → 0, the only way for the firms
to share a common upper utility bound is for one firm to obtain all of the shoppers in the event of a
tie. In particular, as detailed in Appendix B1, when pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i
1−θj
)
< pi−1j
(
θjpi
m
j
1−θi
)
the equilibrium has
xi → 0, xj → 1, and u¯→ pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i
1−θj
)
. Given this, firm j advertises with a probability converging to one,
αj → 1, but firm i still mixes over advertising with limA→0 αi ∈ (0, 1). This limit equilibrium converges
to the equilibrium of a model that allows for A = 0 explicitly without our tie-break rule. There, when
A = 0, both firms find it optimal to advertise with probability one and to price on a common support.
In equilibrium, the firms use equivalent utility distributions to those derived above, but firm i advertises
um with a probability mass equivalent to limA→0(1− αi).
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formally summarizes our equilibrium results:
Proposition 1. Under our tie-breaking rule, the game has the following unique equilib-
rium:
1. If Aa
pima
+ Ab
pimb
≤ 1−θ, each firm i offers ui = um and does not advertise with probability
(1−αi) ∈ (0, 1) according to (2), and advertises an offer ui from the interval (um, u¯]
according to (4) with probability αi, where u¯ solves (6) and where xa = 1 − xb is
given by (5).
2. If Aa
pima
+ Ab
pimb
≥ 1 − θ, both firms offer ui = um and never advertise, while shoppers
visit firm a with a probability xa ∈
[
1− Aa
pima (1−θ) ,
Ab
pimb (1−θ)
]
.
Henceforth, we focus only on the more interesting equilibrium with sales behavior. In
the next section, we provide a detailed discussion of the effects of market asymmetries by
formally examining a selection of comparative statics. However, in the remainder of this
section, we now briefly outline how our framework can reproduce and substantially extend
a large range of equilibria from the existing literature through further specification of each
firm’s utility offer, ui, and associated profits per consumer, pii(ui). More precisely, while
our assumptions sometimes differ to those used within the literature, we now demonstrate
that our key equilibrium predictions for pricing, advertising, and purchase behavior are
often identical to those predicted within the existing literature even in our more general
setting.
Unit demand: Following our previous unit demand example, suppose ui = Vi − pi and
pii(ui) = Vi−ci−ui, where umi = 0, and pimi = Vi. Under symmetry, this provides a simple
clearinghouse equilibrium, and reproduces the (popularized) equilibrium of Varian (1980)
when A→ 0. In particular, our results imply xi = 0.5, such that we obtain the following
familiar expressions: p¯i = θ(V−c)
2
+A, 1− α = 2A
(1−θ)(V−c) , and u¯ =
2(1−θ)(V−c)−4A
2−θ . By then
using F (p) = 1−F (u), one can further derive 1−F (p) = θ(V−p)+4A
2(1−θ)(p−c)) , with p = V −um = V
and p = V − u¯ = c+ θ(V−c)+4A
2−θ .
Under asymmetry, the previous literature has largely focused on considering various
combinations of asymmetries in terms of loyal shares, product values and/or costs under
the restriction that Ai = Aj → 0. Our framework synthesizes some versions of these
equilibria by allowing for any θi, ci, and Vi while also extending them to allow for positive
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asymmetric advertising costs.11 In particular, as further detailed in Appendix B1, the
equilibrium with Ai = Aj → 0 has xi → 0 and xj → 1 when (1 − θi)(Vi − ci) <
(1 − θj)(Vj − cj). By then denoting ∆V = Vi − Vi, and noting that Fi(uj) = Pr(ui ≤
uj) = 1 − Fi(pj + ∆V ) and Fj(ui) = 1 − Fj(pi − ∆V ), we can derive some familiar
expressions for Fi(p) on [Vi − u¯, Vi) and Fj(p) on [Vj − u¯, Vj), where firm j tends to
always advertise, αj → 1, but where firm i refrains from advertising with probability
1− αi = 1− Fi(Vi) ∈ (0, 1).
Downward-sloping demand: Suppose firm i has Ki products, where ci, pi and qi(pi)
denote the associated vectors of marginal costs, prices, and product demand functions
for each consumer. The utility at firm i is then given by each consumer’s associated
surplus, ui = S(pi,qi(pi)). To ensure Assumption U holds with u
m
a = u
m
b , we must
restrict attention to cases with pia(u) = pib(u) = pi(u). Aside from settings where the firms
have the same product range and costs Ka = Kb, qa = qb and ca = cb, this can also
be satisfied in some settings where demand and costs vary under specific relationships
(as later detailed in Section 6). Given the sales equilibrium, each firm i then chooses
its price vector to maximize its profits subject to supplying its required utility draw, ui,
with p∗i (ui) = argmaxpi pi(pi) subject to S(pi,q(pi)) = ui. In a symmetric context, this
set-up reproduces versions of i) clearinghouse equilibria (e.g. Baye et al. (2004a) and Baye
et al. (2006)) or Baye and Morgan (2001) when firms sell single products given exogenous
A and θ), and ii) the equilibrium of Simester (1997) when firms sell multiple products
with zero marginal costs and A → 0. More substantially, for any marginal costs, our
framework extends these equilibria to permit positive asymmetric advertising costs, and
asymmetric loyal-shares. See Appendix B2 for more formal details.
Other applications: Finally, our equilibrium can also be applied more broadly to explore
some under-studied sales practices. For instance, through further specification of the
utility and profit functions, current ongoing work by the authors examines i) two-part
tariff sales as observed in markets such as energy and telecommunications, and ii) non-
price sales where firms offer quantity extensions involving ‘bonus packs’ or ‘X% Free’.
11For example, among others, this application reproduces and extends i) the sales equilibrium of
Narasimhan (1988) with vertically differentiated products and asymmetric loyal shares (pp.439-440),
ii) the second stage equilibrium of Gu and Wenzel (2014)’s two-stage obfuscation game and the adver-
tising game of Ireland (1993) and Roy (2000) which all allow for asymmetric θi, iii) Baye and De Vries
(1992) trade equilibrium which allows for asymmetric ci, iv) the second stage equilibrium of Schmidt
(2013)’s two-stage cost-investment game which allows for asymmetric ci and θi, and v) the second stage
equilibrium of Jing (2007)’s two-stage quality-investment game which allows for asymmetric Vi, ci and θi
(Propositions 1 and 1A when loyals and shoppers share common preferences).
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4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we use our framework to provide a range of comparative statics. For
symmetric market cases, our findings extend the standard clearinghouse results to a more
general setting. More substantially, for asymmetric market cases where the literature has
previously offered a very limited understanding, we offer several new results that differ to
the symmetric case in interesting and subtle ways.
4.1 Changes in Firms’ Shares of Loyal Consumers
In the symmetric market case, one can verify a generalized form of the standard clear-
inghouse results - an increase in the proportion of loyal consumers, θ, deters firms from
advertising better offers, and leads to a lower advertising probability, α, lower expected
utility offers, E(u), and higher equilibrium profits, p¯i. However, we now isolate the more
complex effects from a change in an individual firm’s loyal share, θi. As these effects
are difficult to characterize generally, we focus on evaluating the asymmetric comparative
statics at the point of symmetry. To proceed, one must also stipulate whether the increase
in θi comes at the expense of a reduced proportion of rival loyals, θj = θ−θi, or a reduced
proportion of shoppers, 1− (θi + θj). We first consider the former:
Proposition 2. Consider an increase in firm i’s loyal share θi (and associated reduction
in firm j’s loyal share) in an otherwise symmetric market. Starting from θi = θj, this i)
decreases xi, ii) increases p¯ii, iii) decreases p¯ij, iv) decreases αi and E(ui), and v) increases
αj and E(uj).
Following an increase in θi, firm i is less willing to advertise higher utilities holding all
else constant. Therefore, to maintain a common u¯, this must be offset by a reduction in
firm i’s tie-break share, xi. Hence, an increase in θi produces both a direct effect, and an
indirect effect through the reduction in xi. First, take firm i’s profits p¯ii = θipi
m+
(
xi
1−xi
)
A.
The positive direct effect dominates the negative indirect effect to ensure that p¯ii rises.
In contrast, firm j’s profits fall despite the positive indirect effect in raising xj because
it also receives a reduction in θj. Second, the indirect effect’s impact in reducing xi
and increasing xj ensure that firm i’s advertising probability decreases and that firm j’s
increases. Finally, in terms of the utility distributions, these changes prompt lower average
utility offers at firm i, but higher average offers at firm j. While very intuitive, this last
result differs to the equivalent finding in Arnold et al. (2011) who allow for asymmetric
θi with unit demand and A > 0 under an equal tie-break rule, xi = 0.5. Instead, they
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suggest that the firm with the larger loyal share, firm i, adopts a pricing strategy when
advertising that is more aggressive than its rival. This contrasts sharply to the results in
our model, and in models with A = 0 such as Narasimhan (1988).12
4.2 Changes in Firms’ Advertising Costs
As before, one can verify a generalized form of the standard clearinghouse results in
the symmetric market case - an increase in advertising costs, A, deters the firms from
advertising better offers and softens competition for the shoppers in a way which lowers
the firms’ advertising probability, α, raises equilibrium profits, p¯i, and reduces consumers’
expected utility offers, E(u). We now document some new, more nuanced, effects from a
change in an individual firm’s advertising cost, Ai.
Proposition 3. Consider an increase in Ai in an otherwise symmetric market. This
leads to i) a lower xi, ii) no change in p¯ii, iii) a one-for-one increase in p¯ij, and iv) a
reduction in advertising probabilities and expected utility offers for both firms.
Ceteris paribus, an increase in Ai reduces the incentives for firm i to advertise higher
utilities. Therefore, this must be offset by a reduction in firm i’s tie-break share, xi, to
maintain a common u¯. In particular, in this setting, it follows that xi =
Aj
Ai+Aj
such
that the firm with the higher advertising cost receives the smaller share of shoppers in
a tie. Firm i’s profits can then be written as p¯ii =
θ
2
pim + (
Aj
Ai
)
Ai where an increase in
own advertising costs has no aggregate effect because the direct positive effect is exactly
offset by the negative indirect effect through the reduction in xi. However, an increase
in Ai increases the rival firm j’s profits via the indirect effect in raising xj. Hence, after
decomposing the effects in this way, we can see that it is rival rather than own advertising
costs that matter for individual profits. Finally, given the otherwise symmetric market,
Proposition 3 also suggests that both firms employ an identical advertising probability
and an identical utility distribution which depend only on total advertising costs, Aa+Ab.
Thus, any increase in Ai generates a common reduction in advertising probabilities and
expected utility offers for both firms.13
12With two exceptions, our findings remain robust in the alternative case where the increase in firm
i’s share of loyals comes at the expense of a reduction in the proportion of shoppers. First, an increase
in θi now raises firm j’s profits because it only benefits from the rise in xj without the reduction in θj .
Second, an increase in θi can provide reversed effects on αj and E(uj) if advertising costs are relatively
high. This highlights the importance of considering positive advertising costs and arises because of the
conflicting effects from a decrease in the proportion of shoppers, (1 − θ), and an increase in xj which
varies in the level of A. However, it remains that firm i still offers a lower average utility than firm j.
(Full details on request).
13These last results become less stark in our later analysis when n > 2 where advertising cost asymme-
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4.3 Changes in Firms’ Profit Functions
Firms’ profit functions may differ due to many factors including costs, products, demand,
or pricing technologies. As discussed in Section 3, the literature has only been able
to consider a few such asymmetries under the case of zero advertising costs, and has
certainly been unable to provide any general set of comparative statics. Some related
technical difficulties are also present in our framework because such asymmetries may i)
influence profits differently at different levels of utility, and ii) lead to asymmetric levels
of monopoly utility, umi 6= umj .
However, we can consider how the effects of asymmetries in firms’ profit functions for
a tractable case where the shape of the profit function is always preserved and umi remains
constant. This ‘multiplicative’ case involves pii(u) = (1 − τi)pi(u) with τi ∈ [0, 1), where
an increase in τi represents a reduction in firm i’s per-consumer profits or ‘profitability’
via any associated change in costs, products, demand or pricing technology.
Proposition 4. Suppose pii(u) = (1 − τi)pi(u) and consider an increase in τi within an
otherwise symmetric market. This leads to i) a lower xi, ii) a lower p¯ii, iii) a higher p¯ij,
and iv) a reduction in advertising probabilities and expected utility offers for both firms.
Surprisingly, these results share some features with those for asymmetric advertising
costs. This arises because many of the equilibrium expressions depend only on the ratio
(1− τi)/Ai. For instance, similar to the previous subsection, xi = 1−τi2−τi−τj . Intuitively, an
increase in τi reduces firm i’s incentives to advertise higher utilities and must therefore
be offset by an decrease in xi. Also like the case of asymmetric advertising costs, any
increase in τi generates an equal reduction in advertising probabilities and expected utility
offers for both firms. However, the two cases differ when considering equilibrium profits,
p¯ii =
θ
2
(1 − τi)pim + 1−τi1−τjA. An increase in τi, reduces p¯ii both directly, and indirectly via
an decrease in xi, while an increase in τj, increases p¯ii via an indirect effect in increasing
xi.
5 More Than Two Firms
In this section, we now illustrate the framework’s further ability to offer new results by
analyzing the number and type of firms that engage in sales behavior in markets with
more than firms, n > 2.
tries begin to influence advertising probabilities and utility distributions. However, the direction of the
reported statics remain.
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The sales literature with heterogeneous firms is particularly scant when n > 2 because
existing models quickly become complex and intractable. However, in a seminal paper,
Baye et al. (1992) establish a central result that states that only two firms can ever engage
in sales behavior when firms vary in their loyal shares within a unit-demand clearinghouse
model with zero advertising costs. Intuitively, the remaining firms with relatively large
loyal shares are less willing to lower their price and prefer, instead, to simply price highly
to their loyal consumers. This finding has been extended to allow the firms to vary in
their product values (Kocas and Kiyak (2006)) or costs (Shelegia (2012)). It has also
been used as the foundation for a number of studies, such as those aiming to endogenize
consumer loyalty (e.g. Chioveanu (2008)).
In contrast, we now show that this two-firm result is a special case of our more general
findings. In particular, once we allow for positive advertising costs, any number of firms
k∗ ∈ [2, n] can engage in equilibrium sales and advertising behavior, and, paradoxically,
this number is (weakly) increasing in the level of advertising costs. Further, we can then
use the flexibility of our framework to provide a broad characterization of the types of
firms that are likely to advertise in equilibrium.
Compared to our previous duopoly model, there are two potential sources of equilib-
rium multiplicity. First, similar to an insight by Baye et al. (1992) for zero advertising
costs, the equilibrium distributions and supports may no longer be unique even in a sym-
metric setting. In particular, provided at least two firms mix in any given interval within
(um, u¯], there may be equilibria where other firms do not mix within that region. Second,
there is a new form of multiplicity that is specific to our framework. Indeed, it is no
longer true that each firm’s tie-break share, xi, is uniquely defined in equilibria where one
or more firms never advertise, αi = 0 for some i.
Therefore, in addition to our previous assumptions, we choose to focus on equilibria
under the following two restrictions. First, with no loss to our qualitative predictions, we
focus on equilibria where within any tie, shoppers disregard firms that never advertise,
such that xi = 0 if αi = 0. Second, for tractability, we focus on equilibria where any
advertising firm advertises over the same convex support (um, u¯], such that F ′i (u) =
fi(u) > 0 for all u ∈ (um, u¯] if αi > 0.14
In what follows, we denote θ−i = θ − θi as the total share of loyal consumers that are
14These restrictions may be less necessary within a symmetric setting. Indeed, within a symmetric
n-firm clearinghouse model with unit demand and positive advertising costs, Arnold and Zhang (2014)
show that the symmetric equilibrium is unique and that asymmetric equilibria do not exist. One may
be able to use similar methods in the symmetric setting of our more general framework. However, to be
sure, we apply our restrictions to both the symmetric and asymmetric settings.
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not loyal to firm i, and k∗ as the number of firms that advertise in equilibrium. We also
denote u˜i as the highest utility that firm i could possibly be willing to advertise, where:
u˜i ≡ pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i + Ai
1− θ−i
)
(8)
This derives from equating firm i’s highest possible profits from advertising pii(u˜i)(1−
θ−i)−Ai, with its lowest possible profits from not advertising, θipimi . Without loss, we then
index the firms in (weakly) decreasing order of u˜i from 1 to n and focus on two settings:
i) a quasi-symmetric setting where u˜i = u˜ > u
m for all i, and ii) a strict asymmetric
setting where u˜1 > u˜2 > ... > u˜n > u
m such that firm n is the least willing to advertise
high utility levels.15 We first state a useful preliminary result.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium that satisfies our restrictions with common upper utility
bound u¯, firm i advertises if and only if u˜i ≥ u¯. Hence, i) if k∗ = n then u˜n ≥ u¯, and ii)
if k∗ ∈ [2, n) then u˜k∗ ≥ u¯ > u˜k∗+1.
This follows by contradiction. Recall that our equilibrium restrictions require firms
that never advertise to receive zero shoppers in a tie, xi = 0 if αi = 0. By definition
of u˜i, any firm i with xi = 0 makes the same profit from not advertising as it would if
it advertised u˜i and won all the shoppers. Therefore, any firm with u˜i > u¯ that never
advertises with αi = 0 would always prefer to advertise u¯. Similarly, any firm with u˜i < u¯
that does advertise with αi > 0 would always prefer to refrain from advertising given our
restriction that any advertising firm must advertise over the entire equilibrium support
u ∈ (um, u¯].
Using Lemma 2, we now derive the game equilibria under our restrictions. While we
show that the equilibrium will always be unique, it is hard to demonstrate existence for
the general case without specifying exact profit functions. However, existence can be
shown for special cases including when the firms are (sufficiently) symmetric, or differ
only in their advertising costs.
Proposition 5. When an equilibrium exists under our restrictions, it is unique. In such
an equilibrium, firms i = {1, ...k∗} advertise with interior probability over (um, u¯], while
any remaining firms, i = {k∗ + 1, ...n} set ui = um and never advertise, where k∗ is
15A third setting where some firms have the same u˜ but some firms do not can also be analyzed.
However, this brings unnecessary complications and so we omit if for brevity.
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uniquely defined by
k∗ =
n if
∑n
i=1
Ai
hi(u˜n)
> (n− 1) ≥∑ni=1 Ai(1−θ)pimi
k ∈ [2, n) if ∑ki=1 Aihi(u˜k) > (k − 1) ≥∑k+1i=1 Aihi(u˜k+1) − 1 (9)
and where hi(u) ≡ pii(u)(1− θ−i)− θipimi > 0.
Note that Ai
hi(u)
≤ 1 for u ∈ [um, u˜i] and Aihi(ui) = 1, so the last term in both of the
sums on the second line of (9) equals 1. This means that in the second line if the second
inequality holds for k = 2, the first inequality is automatically satisfied, as consistent with
our results for n = 2.
To begin to understand Proposition 5, first consider the quasi-symmetric setting with
u˜i = u˜ ≥ um for all i. By using (9), the only possible equilibrium under our restrictions
then has k∗ = n. As detailed in the proof, this equilibrium is symmetric and resembles
that under duopoly: all firms engage in sales behavior on the common interval [um, u¯].
In general, even in this case, neither the utility distributions, Fi(u), or advertising prob-
abilities, αi, will be the same for all the firms unless the firms are exactly symmetric.
As under duopoly, this equilibrium requires advertising costs to be sufficiently small,
(n− 1) ≥∑ni=1 Ai(1−θ)pimi . However, the other corresponding condition on advertising costs
in (9) does not bind (as further explained below).
For the rest of this section, we consider the asymmetric setting where u˜1 > u˜2 > ... >
u˜n > u
m. Here, Proposition 5 provides a number of results to help understand both the
number and the type of firms that use sales and advertising in equilibrium. We consider
each in turn.
5.1 The Number of Firms that Engage in Sales
The number of firms that use sales in equilibrium, k∗, is uniquely determined by the
conditions in (9). First, consider the expressions on the right-hand-side. These provide
an upper bound on advertising costs. When k∗ = n, the upper bound ensures that u¯
is sufficiently large, with u¯ ≥ um, such that all firms have an incentive to advertise.
In contrast, when k∗ < n, the upper bound has a different role. It ensures that u¯ is
sufficiently large, with u¯ > u˜k∗+1, such that all non-advertising firms have no incentive
to advertise. Now consider the expressions on the left-hand-side of (9). These provide a
lower bound to advertising costs for any k∗ ∈ [2, n]. The lower bound ensures that u¯ is
sufficiently small, with u¯ ≤ u˜k∗ , such that all advertising firms are willing to advertise
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ui = u¯ without requiring xi < 0. When n = 2, or in the quasi-symmetric case when
n > 2, this lower bound does not bind because all xi are guaranteed to be positive in
equilibrium. However, in the asymmetric setting with n > 2, this lower bound becomes
important to ensure each xi is well-defined and positive.
To provide a more intuitive explanation of k∗, first suppose the firms vary in u˜ but
share a common advertising cost, Ai = A for all i. Notice that u˜i depends on A, thus we
assume here that the ranking of u˜i does not change with A. Using Proposition 5, we then
note the following result.
Corollary 1. Suppose u˜1 > u˜2 > ... > u˜n ≥ um but Ai = A for all i. In the limit, k∗ = 2
when A → 0. In addition, if the firms have sufficiently symmetric profit functions, with∑n
i=1
1
pimi
> n−1
pimn
, then k∗ = n when A→ (n−1)(1−θ)∑
i 1/pi
m
i
.
When A → 0 our findings confirm and reproduce the result in the existing literature
that only two firms can engage in sales behavior (Baye et al. (1992), Kocas and Kiyak
(2006), Shelegia (2012)). However, while these papers allow for forms of heterogeneity
under unit demand, our results extend the two-firm result to a far broader range of market
settings. Intuitively, when A goes to zero, the only way to have any firms advertise up to
a common utility upper bound is to give the firm with the highest incentive to advertise,
firm 1, all the shoppers in a tie in order to discourage it from advertising higher utilities.
As this can only be done for one firm to ensure that firm 1 and firm 2 are on an equal
footing, no further firms can engage in sales behavior.
However, for larger levels of A, our findings suggest that this two-firm result is a special
case of a new and more general relationship. Indeed, once we allow for positive advertising
costs, any number of firms k∗ ∈ [2, n] may engage in equilibrium sales and advertising
behavior. In order to allow all n firms to advertise, A has to be sufficiently high, and
firms’ profit functions have to be sufficiently similar. For the latter, the condition in the
proposition requires that the sum of the inverse of monopoly profits for all firms is higher
than the inverse for the firm with lowest monopoly profits (firm n) multiplied by n− 1.16
This condition is trivially satisfied for 2 firms, and becomes increasingly stringent as n
grows. As n → ∞ it requires that firms are arbitrarily symmetric in their monopoly
profits. However, the condition makes no restrictions on the firms’ loyal shares, thus any
disparity there can be alleviated by sufficiently high advertising costs and appropriately
16Holding pimn fixed, this condition is most stringent when pi
m
i = pi
m
1 for all i ≤ n−1. Thus the sufficient
condition is pimn >
n−2
n−1pi
m
1 . This is always satisfied for symmetric firms or when n = 2. For n = 3, the
sufficient condition requires that the most profitable firm, firm 1, is less than twice as profitable as the
least profitable firm, firm n.
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set tie-break shares, xi.
In most cases where the condition on monopoly profits is satisfied, this leads to a
surprising result - the equilibrium number of advertising firms, k∗, will weakly increase
as advertising costs, A, increases from 0 to (n−1)(1−θ)∑
i 1/pi
m
i
.17 Provided that the firms have
sufficiently symmetric monopoly profits, this relationship arises because, u¯ (as implicitly
defined by (14)) converges to um faster than u˜n, allowing for the possibility that all firms
may advertise up to the common utility upper bound. More intuitively, an increase in
A softens advertising competition for shoppers and shrinks the differences between u˜i
amongst firms (as all converge to um). This allows for a redistribution of the tie-break
shares, xi, in such a way that all firms share a common upper utility bound. This is
not true for lower levels of A because the spread between firms’ high utility advertising
abilities is too large, and there are not enough tie-break shares to balance each firm’s
incentives. In the extreme where A→ 0, only firm 2 can be made competitive with firm 1
(by allocating all the shoppers to it in case of a tie), and all remaining firms refrain form
sales competition.
5.2 The Types of Firms that Engage in Sales
Finally, having established k∗, we now examine which types of firms are likely to engage in
sales and advertising behavior. Existing results within the literature only consider some
specific dimensions under unit demand and zero advertising (e.g. Baye et al. (1992), Kocas
and Kiyak (2006), Shelegia (2012)). However, in our general setting, we can offer a broader
characterization. In particular, when k∗ < n, Proposition 5 implies that the firms using
sales and advertising will be the firms with the lowest values of u˜i, firms i = {1, ..., k∗}.
Due to the implicit definition of u˜i, we restrict our attention to the multiplicative profit
function that was considered in Section 4.3. Using (8), we can then state:
Corollary 2. Suppose k∗ < n. Ceteris paribus, the firms that engage in sales and adver-
tising behavior will be the firms with the lowest Ai and θi, and the highest pii(u).
Intuitively, firms with the lowest advertising costs and loyal shares have the highest
incentives to advertise high utilities, and will therefore be most likely to engage in sales
in equilibrium. When profits are multiplicative, u˜i is increasing in the profit level. Thus,
more profitable firms are also most likely to engage in sales.
17Notice that u˜i depend on A, as well as does u¯, so k
∗ may be non-monotonic as A transitions from 0
to (n−1)(1−θ)∑
i 1/pi
m
i
, but the overall increase is guaranteed.
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6 Implications for Empirical Research
Understanding the effects of firm heterogeneity in markets is a necessary challenge for em-
pirical work. However, without the foundation of an adequate theoretical model, typical
empirical papers on sales behavior or price dispersion are forced to resort to a ‘cleaning’
procedure that is known to be restrictive. In this section, we now illustrate how our frame-
work can be used to better understand when such an approach is theoretically valid, and
to provide the basis for a modified methodology for settings where the cleaning procedure
is not valid.
Empirical studies often find that firms employ sales that are consistent with the use
of mixed strategies, but exhibit differences in their average price levels.18 This pattern is
driven by two forms of price dispersion. The first ‘spatial’ form of price dispersion arises
from inter-firm differences that remain over time, such as those arising from differences in
firms’ characteristics, products, or costs. The second ‘temporal’ form involves price differ-
ences that vary over time, including those generated by sales behavior. Empirical studies
often wish to separate these two forms of price dispersion. In particular, to focus only on
the temporal form, empirical papers typically ‘clean’ their raw price data by retrieving
a set of price residuals from a price regression involving observable firm characteristics
or firm-level fixed effects. The price residuals are then interpreted as resulting from a
homogeneous symmetric market and used to either i) perform descriptive/reduced-form
analysis of the features of temporal price dispersion, or ii) conduct structural estimations
of market parameters.19
However, this procedure is known to be restrictive. First, Lewis (2008) notes that both
the firm characteristics and their impact on the firms’ profit functions must be stable over
time. Second, Chandra and Tappata (2011) suggest that the interaction between the firm-
level fixed effects and the source of (price) dispersion must be additively separable. These
arguments are extended by Wildenbeest (2011) who provides the only formal justification
for the procedure within the literature.
A version of Wildenbeest’s arguments can be derived within our n-firm clearinghouse
framework, where in contrast, we generalize to positive advertising costs. Suppose con-
sumers have unit demand. Firms can vary in quality and costs subject to a common
18e.g. Lach (2002), Baye et al. (2004a), Baye et al. (2004b), Kocas and Kiyak (2006), Lewis (2008),
Chandra and Tappata (2011), Wildenbeest (2011), Giulietti et al. (2014) and Pennerstorfer et al. (2015).
19Examples of group i) include Sorensen (2000), Lach (2002), Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Barron et al.
(2004), Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata (2011), Pennerstorfer et al. (2015), and Sherman and Weiss
(2015). Examples of group ii) include Wildenbeest (2011), Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013), Giulietti et al.
(2014), Allen et al. (2014), and An et al. (2015).
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value-cost markup, Vi − ci = Ψ for all i such that the firms share a symmetric profit
function, pii(u) = Vi − ci − u = Ψ− u. Assuming symmetric loyal shares and advertising
costs, the firms then employ a symmetric equilibrium utility distribution with um = 0,
u¯ = nΨ(1−θ)−2nA
n−(n−1)θ and F (u) =
θu+2nA
n(1−θ)(Ψ−u) . Under unit demand, pi(ui) = Vi−ui. Therefore,
give the symmetric utility distribution, the firm’s subsequent price distributions are sim-
ple iid translations of each other. Under the assumption that the firms play a stationary
repeated game of finite horizon, each firm then chooses its utility level for each period as
a draw from the equilibrium distribution. Now suppose that the econometrician observes
a panel of price observations for each firm. The econometrician can then obtain measures
of the firms’ utility offers that are entirely cleaned of the effects of firm-heterogeneity by
using one of two possible methods. First, one can use the observed maximum price for
each firm to infer Vi directly, and simply adjust the observed prices to recover ui = Vi−pi.
Second, given pi = Vi − ui, one can regress the raw price data on a set of firm-level fixed
effects, pit = α + δi + εit, to return a set of ‘cleaned’ price residuals that correctly proxy
the utility draws up to a positive constant.20 As the first method may be subject to data
outliers, the literature typically employs the second method.
Wildenbeest’s justification for the cleaning procedure applies only for settings where
the firms employ a symmetric utility distribution and where consumers have unit de-
mand. By using our more general theoretical framework, we now consider some alter-
native settings to further understand the validity of the cleaning procedure and to offer
some modified procedures.
6.1 Downward-Sloping Demand
To ensure that the firms employ a symmetric utility distribution in a market with sym-
metric loyal shares and advertising costs, our framework suggests that firms need to
share a common profit function, pi(u). Under unit demand, this was guaranteed by
Wildenbeest’s constant value-cost markup assumption. However, if instead, demand is
downward-sloping, we require a different condition. To illustrate, suppose each firm has
a linear per-consumer demand function that varies only in its intercept, qi(p) = ai − bp
where ai ≥ 0 and b > 0. Further suppose that firm i has marginal cost ci ≥ 0. One
can then use the results from Section 3 and Appendix B2 to show that u = (ai−bp)
2
2b
and
20In more detail, the estimated residuals εˆit ≡ pit− pavei where pavei is the average price chosen by firm
i. Given unit demand and the symmetric equilibrium utility distribution with average utility offer, uave,
it follows that pit = Vi − uit and pavei = Vi − uave, such that the estimated residuals provide a negative
measure of the utility draws, εˆit ≡ −(ujt − uave).
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pii(u) =
1
b
[ai − bci −
√
2bu][
√
2bu] such that the firms have a symmetric profit function if
and only if ai − bci = Ψ for all i. Intuitively, this more general condition captures some
sense of Wildenbeest’s constant value-cost assumption.
Given this condition, one would then hope to be able to recover the firms’ utility draws
from the raw price data. However, unlike unit demand, the relationship between prices
and utilities is non-linear, u = (ai−bp)
2
2b
. Therefore, despite the possibility of a symmetric
utility distribution, the literature’s cleaning procedure cannot be applied under downward-
sloping demand. Instead, one would have to implement a more complex and data-intensive
procedure to recover the utility draws by using additional quantity data to estimate each
firm’s demand function.
6.2 Asymmetric Utility Distributions
To further explore the cleaning procedure, we now return to the case of unit demand, but
depart from Wildenbeest’s set-up by considering a setting where the firms use asymmetric
utility distributions, Fi(u) 6= F (u). Here, the fixed-effects procedure is no longer valid
because the firms’ price distributions are not simple iid translations of each other.
However, by using the insights of our model, one could consider the following modified
procedure. Given Fi(u) 6= F (u), one has has to recover the utility draws separately for
each firm. Instead of using the fixed-effects regression, one may think about doing this
by estimating a set of firm-specific price regressions. However, this is not valid either
because the interpreted residuals from each regression, εˆit ≡ pit−pavei ≡ uit−uavei , cannot
be compared as the firms now differ in their average utility levels, uavei , due to differences
in their loyal shares, or value-cost margins. Instead, one would have to recover the utility
draws separately under the more direct method. In particular, by using the observed
maximum price of each firm, one would infer Vi, and then calculate each firm’s utility
offer using ui = Vi−pi. As this approach may be sensitive to data outliers, a more robust
method may be to infer Vi by establishing each firm’s ‘regular’ price instead, using a
procedure such as that used in Hosken and Reiffen (2004).
Having recovered the utility draws, one could then use our theoretical insights to anal-
yse the observed price dispersion, or to estimate a structural model within the asymmetric
market setting. For instance, by using our theoretical predictions for the utility distribu-
tion and perhaps the advertising probability, one may be able to use price and advertising
data to estimate each firm’s loyal share, θi, and advertising cost, Ai.
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7 Conclusions
Due to the potential technical complexities, the existing clearinghouse sales literature has
been unable to fully consider the effects of firm heterogeneity on sales competition. This
has restricted theoretical and empirical understanding, and limited policy guidance in
these important markets. Indeed, as Baye and Morgan (2009) state (p.1151), “...little is
known about asymmetric models within this class. Breakthroughs on this front would not
only constitute a major theoretical advance, but permit a tighter fit between the underlying
theory and empirics”.
The current paper has tried to fill this gap by providing a fully asymmetric version
of the clearinghouse sales framework. The framework can i) reproduce and extend many
equilibria from the existing literature, ii) offer a range of new results on how firm het-
erogeneity affects sales behavior and market performance, iii) provide original insights
into the number and type of firms that engage in sales behavior, and iv) offer a deeper
foundation to assess and extend current empirical procedures.
Our framework should induce future research in at least two wider respects. First, it
should encourage a new range of empirical work. Aside from providing a possible new
procedure for analysing sales data under firm heterogeneity, our results also make some
new predictions that are yet to be tested, such as the prediction that the number of firms
using sales can increase under higher advertising costs. Second, future work could extend
our framework to analyse a wider set of sales practices beyond those considered here
under our clearinghouse assumptions. For instance, a modified version of our framework
could consider sales within dynamic consumer inventory models (e.g. Hong et al. (2002)),
or explicit consumer search models (e.g. Stahl (1989) or Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez
(2004)).
Appendix A - Main Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The fact that there are no gaps follows from the following: if there
was a gap, it would have to have been common between both firms. Either firm could then
move the mass of advertised utilities from just above the gap to the bottom of the gap.
This would not alter the probability that those utilities were the best, but would make
the firm earn higher profits. Similarly, if there were point masses in equilibrium, there
would either be ties with a positive probability, in which case each firm could increase its
profits by avoiding them, or only one of the firms would have a point mass, in which case
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the other firm could increase it profits by moving the mass of its utility offers form just
below the point mass to just above. Finally, the lower bound of advertised utilities has
to be um, or otherwise firms could move the mass of lowest advertised utilities down to
um without reducing the probability they capture shoppers and increasing profits.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. When Ai-s satisfy the condition, we know that u¯
exists that solves (6). By construction, there is an equilibrium where firms advertise with
probability given in (2) and set u = um, advertise utilities in (um, u¯] according to F in
(4). Profits are equal for all utility offers and advertising strategies in equilibrium. Not
advertising and setting u 6= um can never be profitable because when not advertising
demand is always the same, but per consumer profit is maximized at um. Advertising
u outside of (um, u¯] gives strictly lower profit than advertising inside the interval. For
u < um that is because no shoppers are attracted, and per consumer profit is lower than
at um. For u > u¯, all shoppers are attracted just as with u¯, but per consumer profit is
lower. Thus equilibrium in described in Part 1 is correct.
What remains to be shown is that no other equilibrium exists for these values of
Ai. There are three other possibilities. First, firms do not advertise at all; second, only
one firm ever advertises; third, both firms advertise but not in the way described in the
proposition above.
Consider the first possibility. There has to be some allocation of loyals to firm i in
equilibrium (xi). Regardless of this allocation, both firms will set u = u
m. For this to be an
equilibrium, no firm has to have profitable deviation. Each firm can deviate to advertising
utility slightly above um and capture all the loyals. Firm i gains (1 − θ)(1 − xi)pimi by
doing so, therefore in equilibrium we should have (1−θ)(1−xi)pimi ≤ Ai for i = a, b. This
can be rewritten as xi ≥ 1 − Ai(1−θ)pimi . Summing up over i gives 1 ≥ 2 −
∑
i
Ai
(1−θ)pimi =⇒∑
i
Ai
pimi
≥ (1− θ), a contradiction. Therefore, if Ai satisfy the condition, it is not possible
that neither firm advertises.
Now consider the second possibility. Assume firm i advertises and firm j does not.
Regardless of what firm i does, firm j’s optimal non-advertising strategy is to set u = um,
so in any such equilibrium it has to do so. Given this, and that firm j advertises with
positive probability, firm b should advertise utility slightly above um and capture all the
shoppers (this in itself is not well defined, but we shall find contradiction nevertheless).
Firm i can only be prevented from also advertising even slightly higher utility if (1 −
θj)pi
m
i < Ai, contradiction with Assumption A.
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Finally, the third possibility is that both firms advertise with positive probability,
but not according to our equilibrium. If so, following standard arguments, they have to
advertise with mixed strategies in a common utility interval without point masses. The
lower bound of this interval, u, has to be um. Assume the opposite. Clearly u < um cannot
be in equilibrium, as u = um strictly dominates (attracts shopper with higher probability,
and increases per consumer profit). If u > um, then given that there can be no point
masses, advertising any u in the interval [um, u) strictly dominates u because shoppers
are attracted with the same probability, but per consumer profit is higher. Thus, if firms
are to advertise, they will do so on the interval (um, u¯]. The left bound is open because
advertising um is always dominated by not advertising and setting u = um. The only way
such an equilibrium differs from our equilibrium, is that αa = αb = 0. This is impossible
for any Ai > 0 (i = a, b), because profit from advertising slightly above u
m would be
given by pimi (1 − θj) − Ai, and has to be no smaller than pimi θi, profit from deviating to
not advertising. This implies Ai ≥ (1 − θ)pimi , which contradicts Aapima +
Ab
pimb
≤ 1 − θ and
Assumption A. This completes proofs of Part 1.
Part 2 can be proven as follows. If neither firm advertises, and shoppers are allocated
according to xa in the interval xa ∈
[
1− Aa
pima (1−θ) ,
Ab
pimb (1−θ)
]
, no firm would want to deviate
and advertise, because even advertising slightly above um would not be profitable (xa is
chosen in such a way). Thus this is an equilibrium, so we need to show that no other
equilibrium exists. Two possibilities exist, one where only one firm advertises, and one
where both firms advertise. The former cannot be the case by Assumption A (see proof
of Part 1 above). The latter is not possible because if both firms advertise, they have to
do so in the fashion described in Part 1 of the proposition, and such equilibrium cannot
be constructed because A exceeds the threshold.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let pii(u) = pi(u), Ai = A and θj = θ − θi. From (6), ∂u¯∂θi = 0
after we impose symmetry ex post with θi = θj. By using this with the derivative of (5),
we gain ∂xi
∂θi
= − A[pim−pi(u¯)]
[pi(u¯)(1−(θ/2))−(θ/2)pim]2 < 0. These two results can then be used to help find
the relevant derivatives: i) Follows directly from above. For ii) and iii), using (3) gives
∂p¯ii
∂θi
= pi(u¯) > 0 and
∂p¯ij
∂θi
= −pi(u¯) < 0. For iv) and v), using (2), ∂αi
∂θi
= − [pim−pi(u¯)]
(1−θ)pim < 0,
and
∂αj
∂θi
= pi
m−pi(u¯)
(1−θ)pim > 0. Further, from (4),
∂Fi
∂θi
= pi(u)−pi(u¯)
(1−θ)pi(u) > 0 and
∂Fj
∂θi
= −pi(u)−pi(u¯)
(1−θ)pi(u) < 0
such that expected utility at firm i (firm j) decreases (increases).
Proof of Proposition 3. Given pii(u) = pi(u) and θi = θ/2, first note from (6) and
(5) that Ai + Aj = pi(u¯)(1 − θ2) − θ2pim = Ajxi , such that xi =
Aj
Ai+Aj
. i) then follows
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directly. For ii)-iii), simply substitute xi into (3) to give p¯ii =
θ
2
pim + Aj. To derive iv),
it is sufficient to substitute xi into (2) to give αi = 1 − Ai+Aj(1−θ)pim , and into (4) to obtain
Fi(u) =
[pim−pi(u)]+[Ai+Aj ]
(1−θ)pi(u) . Lower expected utility offers then follow because an increase
in either advertising cost produces a decrease in αi and increase in Fi(u) in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance, for both i = a, b.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given Ai = A and θi = θ/2, first note from (6) and (5) that
(1 − τi)xj = (1 − τj)xi, such that xi = 1−τi2−τi−τj . i) then follows directly. For ii) and iii),
simply substitute xi into (3) to give p¯ii =
θ
2
(1− τi)pim + 1−τi1−τjA. To derive v), it is sufficient
to substitute xi into (2) to give αi = αj = 1 − 2−τi−τj(1−τi)(1−τj) A(1−θ)pim , and into (4) to obtain
Fi(u) = Fj(u) =
θ
2
[pim−pi(u)]+ 2−τi−τj
(1−τi)(1−τj)A
(1−θ)pi(u) . Lower expected utility offers then follow because
an increase in either τi or τj produces a reduction in αi and an increase in Fi(u) in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, for both i = a, b.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows using some similar steps to Proposition 1
after defining the set of advertising firms as K∗ = {1, ..., k∗}, and noting that any firm l /∈
K∗ with αl = 0 has xl = 0 under our restrictions such that Πj 6=i(1−αj) = Πj 6=i∈K∗(1−αj).
First, we require each firm i ∈ K∗ to be indifferent between not advertising and advertising
a utility slightly higher than um such that pimi [θi + (1− θ)xiΠj 6=i(1− αj)] = pimi [θi + (1−
θ)Πj 6=i(1−αj)]−Ai. This implies that the probability that all firms j 6= i do not advertise
equals:
Πj 6=i(1− αj) = Ai
(1− xi)(1− θ)pimi
. (10)
After plugging this back into the previous equation, we gain p¯ii = θipi
m
i +
xi
1−xiAi for
each i ∈ K∗. The same expression also applies to those firms not in j 6= K∗ that do not
advertise because these firms have xj = 0 under our restrictions.
To ensure a common upper utility bound for each advertising firm, u¯, we then require
p¯ii = (1− θ−i)pii(u¯)−Ai for each i ∈ K∗. This provides an expression for xi for each such
firm, (11), which when summed over i = 1, ..., k∗ and set equal to 1, also provides (12).
When combined, these provide k∗+ 1 equations to solve for k∗+ 1 unknowns, {xi, ..., xk∗}
and u¯.
xi = 1− Ai
pii(u¯)(1− θ−i)− θipimi
≥ 0, (11)
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k∗∑
i=1
[
1− Ai
pii(u¯)(1− θ−i)− θipimi
]
= 1, (12)
Consider the fully asymmetric case first. The LHS of (12) is decreasing in u¯, and thus
reaches its maximum at u¯ = um, and the value is I¯k =
∑k
i=1
[
1− Ai
(1−θ)pimi
]
. It is easy
to see that I¯k is increasing in k. The minimum is reached at u¯ = u˜k, because u¯ cannot
grow further and ensure that all xi are non-negative. The value of the LHS at u¯ = u˜k
is Ik ≡
∑k
i=1
[
1− Ai
pii(u˜k)(1−θ−i)−θipimi
]
. It is easy to see that Ik is increasing in k. This is
because the last element in the sum is 0 (by definition of u˜k), so when k is reduced by 1,
we get a new sum where all the k − 1 remaining elements decrease because of replacing
u˜k with a higher u˜k−1. Finally, note that Ik < I¯k−1 which follows from the fact that both
sums have equal number of non-zero elements, and those in Ik are evaluated at u¯ = u˜k
where each element of the same is lower than at u¯ = um where they are evaluated in I¯k−1.
For the equilibrium we need the largest k such that Ik ≤ 1 < I¯k. If this inequality
holds for k, then we can find u¯ ∈ (um, u˜k] such that (12) holds. Since Ik is decreasing in
k, then (12) will also hold for any k′ < k, however k′ cannot be the equilibrium number of
advertising firms because then firm k will be able to profitably deviate from not advertising
by advertising u¯. This follows from he fact that Ik < 1 and so the solution to (12) for
k′ < k has the property that u¯ > u˜k. Thus the equilibrium k∗ should be such that either
Ik∗ ≤ 1 < Ik∗+1 for k∗ < n,21 or In ≤ 1 < I¯n. These give all the conditions in (12).
As for the quasi-symmetric case, the only possibility is k∗ = n because there is no
way to exclude any of the firms from advertising without giving it a strict incentive to
deviate and advertise. Thus the only requirement of that case is
∑n
i=1
Ai
hi(u˜n)
> (n− 1) ≥∑n
i=1
Ai
(1−θ)pimi where the first part is trivially satisfied because
∑n
i=1
Ai
hi(u˜n)
= n.
All that now remains is to derive the unique equilibrium advertising probabilities and
utility distributions for firms i ∈ K∗. This can be done using similar steps to Proposition
5. To derive the advertising probabilities, plug (11) into (10), such that Πj 6=i(1 − αj) =
Πj 6=i∈K∗(1 − αj) = γi(um) for i = 1, ..., k∗, where γi(u) = pii(u¯)(1−θ−i)−θipii(u)(1−θ)pii(u) ≤ 1. Then
by multiplying each of these k∗ equations together, we get Πk
∗
i=1[Πj 6=i∈K∗(1 − αj)] =
Πk
∗
i=1γi(u
m). On simplification, this equals Πk
∗
i=1(1 − αi)k∗−1 = Πk∗i=1γi(um) such that
Πk
∗
i=1(1 − αi) =
[
Πk
∗
i=1γi(u
m)
] 1
(k∗−1) . By now taking (10) and multiplying both sides by
1 − αi we get Πk∗j=1(1 − αj) = (1− αi)γi(um), which after substitution provides a unique
solution, αi = 1 −
[
Πk
∗
j=1γj(u
m))
] 1
k∗−1
γi(um)
. Similar steps can be they used to derive the unique
21where I¯k∗ follows from Ik < I¯k−1.
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utility distributions, Fi(u) =
[
Πk
∗
j=1γj(u)
] 1
k∗−1
γi(u)
, where Fi(u
m) = 1 − αi and Fi(u¯) = 1 as
required.
In order to guarantee that the equilibrium exists, we need that F ′i (u) > 0. It is trivially
satisfied for k∗ = 2 because Fi(u) = γj(u) and γ′j(u) > 0. In general this is not the case,
and thus one needs to verify this condition for a particular application.
Proof of Corollary 1. Every term in the sum of the LHS of (12) is between 0 and 1.
As A→ 0, if no denominator gets to zero, the LHS converges to k∗. Given that u˜i are all
different form each other, and given that all firms that advertise should have u˜i ≥ u¯, the
only way to make LHS equal k∗ − 1 is to set k∗ = 2 and let u¯ to converge to u˜2. Thus,
when A is sufficiently small, only two firms, 1 and 2, can advertise.
On the other extreme, if it is the case that
∑n
i=1
1
pimi
> n−1
pimn
, then A ≤ (1 − θ)pimn can
be found such that (12) has a solution. This is because at u¯ = um we have the LHS of
(12) equal to n −∑ni=1 A(1−θ)pimi , so as A → (n−1)(1−θ)∑ni=1 1pim
i
, the solution to (12) converges to
um. Given that
∑n
i=1
1
pimi
> n−1
pimn
, we have (n−1)(1−θ)∑n
i=1
1
pim
i
< (1− θ)pimn so that as A→ (n−1)(1−θ)∑n
i=1
1
pim
i
,
u˜n >> u
m, thus equilibrium u¯ can be found.
Proof of Corollary 2. The claims about Ai and θi follow directly from the definition of
u˜i and the characterization of advertising firms. For the multiplicative profit function the
inverse function is pi−1i (x) = pi
−1( x
1−τi ) so u˜i = pi
−1
(
(1−τi)pim+Ai
1−θ−i
1−τi
)
= pi−1
(
pim+Ai/(1−τi)
1−θ−i
)
.
It is now clear that u˜i is decreasing in τi.
Appendix B - Further Technical Equilibrium Details
B1. Market Equilibrium with Asymmetric Firms and Aa = Ab → 0
When the firms are asymmetric but Aa = Ab = A → 0, the equilibrium depends upon
pi−1a
(
θapima
1−θb
)
≷ pi−1b
(
θbpi
m
b
1−θa
)
. Without loss of generality, suppose pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i
1−θj
)
< pi−1j
(
θjpi
m
j
1−θi
)
such that pii(u¯)(1− θj)− θipimi < pij(u¯)(1− θi)− θjpimj . From (5), it must be that xj > xi.
Moreover, with the additional use of (6), for u¯ to exist and for xi and xj to be well defined,
it must be that pii(u¯)(1− θj)− θipimi → 0 such that xi → 0, xj → 1, and u¯→ pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i
1−θj
)
.
Given this, we know limA→0 p¯ii = θipimi and limA→0 p¯ij = limA→0(1 − θi)pij(u¯) = (1 −
θi)pij
(
pi−1i
(
θipi
m
i
1−θj
))
> θjpi
m
j . Further, from (4), we know limA→0 Fi(u) = limA→0
p¯ij−θjpij(u)
(1−θ)pij(u)
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and limA→0 Fj(u) = limA→0
p¯ii−θipii(u)
(1−θ)pii(u) . Finally, from (2), αj → 1, while firm i advertises
with probability limA→0 αi = 1− p¯ij−θjpi
m
j
(1−θ)pimj ∈ (0, 1).
Unit Demand Example: Suppose ui = Vi − pi and pii(ui) = Vi − ci − ui, where
umi = 0, and pi
m
i = Vi. By using the results above, the equilibrium then depends upon
(1 − θa)(Va − ca) − (1 − θb)(Vb − cb) ≶ 0. For instance, when this is negative, xa → 0
and xb → 1, such that p¯ia → θa(Va − ca), and p¯ib → (1 − θa)((Vb − cb) − u), where
u→
(
(1−θ)(Va−ca)
1−θb
)
. By then denoting ∆V = Va − Vb, and noting that Fa(ub) = Pr(ua ≤
ub) = 1 − Fa(pb + ∆V ) and Fb(ua) = 1 − Fb(pa − ∆V ), it follows that Fa(p) = 1 −[
p¯ib−θb(p−∆V−cb)
(1−θ)(p−∆V−cb)
]
= 1 + θb
1−θ − (1−θa)(θa(Va−ca)+(1−θb)(ca−cb−∆V ))(1−θb)(1−θ)(p−∆V−cb) on [Va − u¯, Va) and Fb(p) =
1−
[
p¯ia−θa(p+∆V−ca)
(1−θ)(p+∆V−ca)
]
= 1−
[
θa(Vb−p)
(1−θ)(p+∆V−ca)
]
on [Vb − u¯, Vb), where αb → 1 but where firm
a refrains from advertising with probability 1− αa = 1− Fa(Va) ∈ (0, 1).
B2. Equilibrium with Downward-Sloping Demand
Given pi = {pi1, ....piKi}, the individual consumer product demand functions at firm
i can be permitted to be interrelated, as summarized by the demand vector qi(pi) =
{qi1(pi), ....qiKi(pi)}. One can then write ui = S(pi,q∗i (pi)), where S(pi,qi(pi)) denotes
the indirect utility available at firm i for a given level of demand, and where q∗i (pi) denotes
a consumer’s optimal demand vector at firm i, q∗i (pi) = argmaxqi S(.). It then follows
that pii(pi) = q
∗
i (pi)
′(pi − ci), where ci = {ci1, ....ciKi}.
Under monopoly, firm i would set a vector of monopoly prices, pmi = argmaxpi pii(pi),
with umi = S(p
m
i ,q
∗
i (p
m
i )) and pii(u
m
i ) ≡ pii(pim). Hence, for Assumption U to hold with
uma = u
m
b , we restrict attention to cases with pia(u) = pib(u) = pi(u).
Under suitable demand assumptions, there can exist a unique efficient price vector
that maximizes a firm’s profits subject to the constraint of supplying a given utility
draw u, such that p∗(u) = argmaxp pi(p) subject to S(p,q
∗(p)) = u, with resulting
profits per consumer, pi(u) ≡ pi(p∗(u)).22 It then follows that p¯ii = θipi(pm) + xi1−xiAi,
αi = 1 − Ajxi(1−θ)pi(pm) , and Fi(u) =
xiθj [pi(p
m)−pi(p∗(u))]+Aj
xi(1−θ)pi(p∗(u)) , where p = p
∗(um) = pm and
p = p∗(u¯), and where xi and u¯ follow from amended versions of (5) and (6).
To consider how our framework then reproduces the standard clearinghouse equilib-
rium, suppose that the market is symmetric. It then follows that xi = 0.5. Further, let
K = 1 such that p ≡ p, p¯i = θ
2
pi(pm) + A, 1− α =
(
2A
(1−θ)pi(pm)
)
, and pi(u¯) =
(
θpi(pm)+4A
(2−θ)
)
.
22This constrained pricing decision can be thought of as Ramsey problem. Individual prices can be
hard to fully characterize, but with additional restrictions, firms can be shown to optimally use lower
prices on products that are more price-elastic and complementary to other products. See Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) and Simester (1997) for more discussion.
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We can then use F (p) = 1− F (u) to find the price distribution (conditional on advertis-
ing) FA(p) ≡ 1−F (u)α which equals 1α
[
1−
(
θ[pi(pm)−pi(p)]+4A
2(1−θ)pi(p)
)]
with p = pi−1
(
θpi(pm)+4A
(2−θ)
)
and
p = pm. Finally, to consider how our framework reproduces the equilibrium of Simester
(1997), suppose the market is symmetric with K ≥ 1 and A→ 0, and let all marginal costs
equal zero. One can then replicate the equilibrium using xi = 0.5 under the additional
restriction that loyals and shoppers share common demand functions.
Appendix C: Relaxing the Visit Assumptions
In this appendix, we provide further details on how the duopoly model can be generalized
to allow for multiple visits and non-negligible visit costs. Suppose that the cost of visiting
any first firm is s1 and the cost of visiting any second firm is s2. The main model implicitly
assumed that s1 = 0 and s2 = ∞. However, we now show that our equilibrium remains
for any s2 > 0 provided that the costs of any first visit are not too large, s1 ∈ [0, um), and
that shoppers can only purchase from a single firm. Similar (but more tedious) arguments
can also be made for the n-firm model.
First, suppose s1 ∈ [0, um) but maintain s2 =∞. Beyond the case of s1 = 0, this now
also permits cases where the costs of a first visit are strictly positive provided um > 0 as
consistent with downward-sloping demand and linear prices. In particular, provided that
the monopoly utility is larger than s1, consumers will still be willing to make a first visit
and the equilibrium will remain unchanged.
Now suppose that s2 > 0 subject to a persistent assumption of one-stop shopping, such
that a consumer cannot buy from more than one firm. By definition, the behavior of the
loyal consumers will remain unchanged. Therefore, to demonstrate that our equilibrium
remains robust, we need to show that shoppers will endogenously refrain from making a
second visit. Initially suppose that firms keep playing their original equilibrium strategies
and that a shopper receives h ∈ 0, 1, 2 adverts. Given s2 > 0 and the assumption of
one-stop shopping, the gains from any second visit will always be strictly negative for
all h. In particular, if h ≥ 1, then a shopper will first visit the firm with the highest
advertised utility, u∗ < um, and any offer from a second visit would necessarily provide
u < u∗. Alternatively, if h = 0, then both firms will offer um, and so any second visit is
unable to offer a gain in utility. Now suppose that firms can deviate from their original
equilibrium strategies. To see that the logic still holds, note that only the behavior of any
non-advertising firms is relevant and that such firms are unable to influence any second
visit decisions due to their inability to communicate or commit to any u < um. Hence,
32
firms’ advertising and utility incentives remain unchanged and the original equilibrium
still applies.
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